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Abstract 
Disasters can be seen as magnifying glasses on the behavior of subjects and on their 
(preliminary and contextual) decision-making processes. In fact, the sudden and disruptive 
events connected with the disaster do not trigger “unusual” behaviors, instead they offer an 
accelerated and exaggerated representation of normal organizational behaviors and problems, 
allowing the observation of the whole process of actions and decisions involved. This 
contribution proposes a reflection on two case studies (the AZF disaster and the Indian Ocean 
tsunami) that deals with issues related to the identification and management of risks in an 
industrial setting and to the coordination of cooperative behavior during post-disaster relief 
activities. 
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Organization in disaster - Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Disasters are sudden calamitous events bringing great damage, loss, and 
destruction. The subject of the organization of disaster prevention and post-
disaster relief management is particularly interesting for the organizational 
reflection. 
From a theoretical point of view, a disaster can be seen as a magnifying 
lens on the behavior of subjects and in particular on their (preliminary and 
contextual) decision-making processes. In fact, the sudden and disruptive 
events connected with the disaster do not trigger “unusual” behaviors, instead 
they emphasize and make more evident the typical behaviors and problems of 
“normal” organizational situations. Furthermore, the concentration in time and 
space of such events allows the observation of the whole process of actions and 
decisions involved. As a matter of fact, disasters offer, in a “nutshell”, an 
accelerated and exaggerated representation of normal organizational behaviors 
and problems. 
From a practical point of view, the study of the organization in disasters 
has direct consequences in terms of actual prevention, risk management, 
mitigation and relief strategies and techniques.  
In fact, while the subject of disaster prevention, preparedness and 
mitigation has been debated since the early 1950s, it has become an important 
topic of discussion after the natural and industrial disasters of the 1970s and 
1980s and has gained a fundamental importance after the 2001 terroristic 
attacks. Currently, issues related to risk management, organizational resilience, 
prevention of accidents at work and coordination of post-disaster relief efforts 
have got a very high rank on the agendas of public policy makers and top 
managers. 
The theoretical reflection has developed consistently with the need for 
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practical solutions and has proposed many approaches and intervention 
strategies. In particular, we can identify two main strands of research. A 
mainstream literature, with a functionalist perspective, that aims to find 
efficient strategies to identify risks, develop scenarios, implement plans for 
managing risks and recovering from undesired events. An interactionist 
literature, which considers disasters as unpredictable events and underlines the 
impossibility to foresee and plan both prevention and rescue activities. 
The first approach is usually shared by policy makers and represents the 
basis for the most popular techniques of risk management and emergency 
management: it involves the elaboration of detailed formal procedures aimed to 
anticipate and control all the possible causes and consequences of a disaster. 
The second approach is very effective in understanding and representing the 
failures and the mistakes affecting the mainstream approach, but does not allow 
any kind of generalization. 
The purpose of this contribution is to propose a different approach to the 
study of the organization in disasters, based on a perspective that considers the 
the organization as a process of actions and decisions pursuing bounded 
rationality.  
According to this perspective, human decision making processes are 
always trying to anticipate future events and to plan (i.e. to regulate) future 
behavior. However, since decision-making processes are affected by bounded 
rationality, preliminary regulation is never able to perfectly steer the future 
behavior, thus requiring contextual regulation. Hence, all the decision-making 
processes involved in disaster prevention, risk management and relief 
coordination planning can be interpreted as attempts to preliminary arrange 
future behavior. 
The two essays presented in this contribution propose a reflection on two 
case studies that deals with the main issues related to the organization in 
disasters: prevention and risk management, planning of interventions to 
mitigate the effects of the disaster and coordination of relief activities. In 
particular, the first essay addresses the issue of the identification and 
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management of risks in an industrial setting. The analysis shows the fallacies of 
secondary and tertiary prevention systems and the need to focus on primary 
prevention. The second essay deals with the issue of cooperation and 
coordination in post-disaster relief activities and highlights how the cooperative 
action of the rescuers does not guarantee the integration of their actual 
behavior: the identification and analysis of the various processes of decisions 
and actions involved explains the coexistence of cooperative attitude and 
competitive behavior in the relief efforts. 
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The failure of foresight in managing risks 
Francesco Maria Barbini, Università di Bologna 
	
	
	
Introduction 
In the last decades, the issues related to disasters prevention and 
emergency preparedness have reached the highest positions in the strategic 
agenda of our Society: industrial hazards, natural disasters and rising terrorist 
threats are boosting investments and law enforcements for better managing 
risks and pursuing preparedness (Kovoor-Misra et al., 2000; Tixier et al., 2002; 
McConnell, Drennan, 2006). Overall, the approach widely adopted by 
policymakers is based on the assumption that preparedness is a “state of 
readiness to respond to environmental threats. It results from a process in 
which a community examines its susceptibility to the full range of 
environmental hazards (vulnerability analysis), identifies human and material 
resources available to cope with these threats (capability assessment), and 
defines the organisational structures by which a coordinated response is to be 
made (plan development)” (Perry and Lindell, 2003: 338).  Furthermore, recent 
organizational literature has focused on the analysis of causes and modalities 
by which accidents happens and may initiate disasters (e.g. Perrow, 1984, 2007; 
Vaughan, 1996;  Weick, Sutcliffe, 2007). 
However, despite the relevant efforts devoted to risk management and 
emergency preparedness, disasters still occur and, even though contingency 
plans are continuously improved, actual post-disaster recovery activities show 
relevant inefficiencies. 
This contribution aims at interpreting the relationships between 
preliminary regulation and actual post-disaster relief processes to identify 
strategies for improving risk prevention and disaster mitigation processes.  To 
this end, in the next Paragraph, different research perspectives are described 
and discussed. Then, the most important facts related to the AZF disaster are 
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introduced and explained by means of the different theoretical postures. 
Finally, a new approach toward prevention and planning processes is 
envisaged. 
This contribution is developed around a case study. Such case is not 
intended to falsify some theories; instead, it is to be considered as “an occasion 
for reflecting” on the subject of disaster prevention. The AZF case has been 
selected because of three reasons. 
Firstly, at the time of the disaster, AZF was applying state of the art risk 
management techniques (unlike, for instance, the case of Bhopal): plans for risk 
management and disaster mitigation were available; the solutions adopted  for 
managing risks were coherent  with legal prescriptions and best practices, and 
inspections and emergency drills were performed regularly. 
In addition, the disaster does not appear to have been originated by 
evident human or organizational mistakes (unlike, for example, the case of 
Chernobyl). While the causes of the disaster have not been discovered yet, there 
is no final evidence of particular organizational faults or specific human 
responsibilities. In fact, in the years following the disaster, experts have 
proposed many different hypotheses about the cause of the explosion, from 
those related to a mix of chemicals improperly stored together, to the fall of a 
meteorite, to the terrorist attack. In particular, the working conditions of 
workers belonging to subcontractor firms and their training on safety 
procedures have been debated (Jean, 2002; 2011; 2013 ; Chaskiel, 2007; Suraud, 
2007). The long history of the judicial process has not resolved the doubts and 
on the contrary has fostered the proliferation of hypotheses (Le Figaro, 2009; Le 
Monde, 2015). For the purposes of this discussion, however, it is sufficient to 
highlight that the conduct of AZF before the accident was consistent with the 
provisions of national and international standards and was coherent with the 
most popular practices for managing risks and mitigating accidents. 
Finally, even if the city of Toulouse was applying specific solutions for 
managing risks and mitigating possible disasters, the actual rescue activities 
have been carried out without strictly following the emergency procedures. 
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The AZF case has been drawn up basing on direct and indirect data. To 
this end, people charged of security tasks and working on the site when the 
explosion took place, as well as residents who have witnessed the disaster, have 
been interviewed. Additional information has been gathered during meetings 
with researchers working on a psycho-sociological research on the effects of the 
disaster. Finally, indirect material has been drawn from official reports and 
documentation files. 
The research has been performed adopting a qualitative posture. Such a 
posture is coherent with the objective of this contribution, i.e. to highlight the 
main facts related to the AZF disaster and to explain them basing on available 
theories.  The theories selected for interpreting the case are dominant in the 
literature or they are deemed particularly effective for explaining the 
organization in disaster. 
 
On the effectiveness of preliminary regulation 
The disaster prevention and recovery strategies currently applied by 
policymakers rely on the detailed predefinition of relief strategies and 
procedures. In other words, policymakers are trying to predict the effects of any 
kind of disaster in order to minimize the damages and to predetermine relief 
activities. Coherently with this approach, disaster-ready institutions are used to 
perform regular emergency drills to test the effectiveness of the emergency 
procedures and to evaluate the rescuers’ efficiency in applying such 
procedures.  
Relevant literature is supporting this approach, stressing in particular the 
importance to develop flexible and efficient plans (Healy, 1969; Quarantelli, 
1982, 1985, 1998; Lagadec, 1993; Perry, Lindell, 2003). Furthermore, the planning 
process is considered the best place for implementing emergency procedures 
(Shelton, Sifers, 1994; Perry, Lindell, 2003: 338). In fact, according to the 
literature, a planning process carried out consistently with a set of specific 
guidelines should allow the achievement of “rational” responses to 
emergencies. Quarantelli (1982), proposes ten principles inspiring efficient 
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disaster planning; similar guidelines are proposed by Alexander (2003), 
Lagadec (1993), and Perry and Lindell (2003). Recently, the widespread 
application in the United States of Incident Command Systems (ICS) techniques 
(Cardwell, 2000; DHS, 2004; FEMA, 2004; Hannestad, 2005; Buck et al., 2006) has 
revitalized this approach. ICS techniques suggest the full predefinition of rules 
and organizational roles for efficiently coordinating and managing personnel 
and equipment at a wide range of emergencies. The proposed system is strictly 
formalized, characterized by role specialization and detailed procedures, and 
based on particularized training. A fundamental feature of an ICS is the 
“escalation principle”: the size and the complexity of the ICS are in fact 
modularized depending on the nature the contingent  situation, with detailed 
adaptation procedures regulating such escalation (Bigley, Roberts, 2001; Lindell 
et al., 2007). ICSs are supposed to allow the development of  high reliability 
organizations (HROs) based on tight structural regulation (to achieve efficiency) 
coupled with high operational flexibility (to achieve effectiveness): “this 
research suggests the possibility of new organizational forms able to capitalize 
on the control and efficiency benefits of bureaucracy, while at the same time 
avoiding or overcoming the considerable tendencies toward inertia that are 
thought to accompany bureaucratic systems” (Bingley, Roberts, 2001: 1281). 
Other theoretical studies (e.g. Lanzara, 1983; Gephart, 1984; Roux-Dufort, 
Vidaillet, 2003) stress the role of improvisation processes in achieving effective 
relief interventions. According to such interpretations, the organization of the 
relief activities “emerges” almost spontaneously from a set of creative, random, 
and sometimes irrational behaviors. Hence, from this point of view, the efforts 
headed to the predetermination of the relief activities are useless and may 
inhibit social sensemaking and, ultimately, the self-development of an effective 
organization (Weick, 1988). Instead, rescuers should be trained and allowed to 
act creatively, without excessive rules limiting their freedom of action. From a 
similar perspective, Turner (1976, 1978; Turner, Pidgeon 1997) introduced a 
theory for interpreting organizational behavior in disasters. Turner, in fact, 
proposed a framework to explain the process of “construction” of the 
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catastrophe and identifying the various factors hindering a full rationality in the 
prevention process. This process of social construction of disasters has been 
inducted from the analysis of three major disasters and is composed by six 
stages: (I) Initial beliefs and norms, (II) Incubation period, (III) Precipitating 
event, (IV) Onset, (V) Rescue and salvage, (VI) Full cultural readjustment. This 
perspective also devotes high attention to cultural factors permeating the 
organization and outlines their role in the development of disasters (Gherardi, 
1998).  
The theoretical perspectives described above are based on particular 
assumptions about the rationality of human beings. The theories focusing on 
the predefinition of risk management techniques and on the detailed 
formalization of emergency activities usually share an attitude toward absolute 
rationality: they consider the human being as an optimizer, able to foresee and 
analyze risks, to organize the protection system, and to define recovery actions. 
On the other hand, theories focusing on improvisation, bricolage and on the 
social construction of reality generally agree on a concept of contextual 
rationality, i.e. on the absence of an intendedly rational decision-making 
process. Instead, they explain human behavior as determined by social sense-
making processes. According these authors, the strategies inspiring the actors 
become evident only after the actual behavior. 
A different approach for studying the organization in disaster can be 
developed from Simon’s theory of bounded and intentional rationality. 
According to Simon, in fact, “human behavior is intendedly rational, but only 
boundedly so” (Simon, 1947: 88). In other words, decision-making processes 
cannot be fully rational (since it is impossible identify all the consistent means 
and to rank and clearly define goals). However, Simon stressed that a decision-
making process does exist and human beings direct their behavior toward 
certain goals, trying (even without succeeding) to select alternatives which are 
conductive to the achievement of the previously selected (fuzzy) goals. Human 
beings are continuously trying to plan their future behavior. Plans are just 
“devices” for influencing future decision, being impossible to fully determine 
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future decisions and actions; plans are decided, but they are continuously 
modified and integrated by actual decision-making processes. 
A framework for studying the organization in disaster consistent with 
Simon’s theory has been proposed by Thompson and Hawkes (1962). Such 
framework describes the major events related with the development of the 
organization of relief activities, highlighting the main decision-making 
processes involved. Overall, Thompson and Hawkes identified four typical 
steps in the relief process: (1) survivors (and disaster-ready institutions within 
the impact area)  act individually or in small, auto-regulated, groups to help 
those in need; (2) professional rescuers arrive from outside the disaster-affected 
area, thus trying to apply predefined relief routines and procedures; (3) 
additional uncommitted resources arrive and need to be used; information 
about the need for additional resources begin to flow; (4) the group of people 
able to collect information concerning the need for resources and their actual 
availability, and to coordinate relief cooperative activities affirms itself as the 
control centre for this emergency. 
This organization process is defined as “synthetic organization”. A 
synthetic organization is an ad-hoc organization that takes place to overcome 
the effects of large-scale disasters, “without the benefit of planning or 
blueprints, prior designations of authority, or formal authority to enforce its 
rules or decisions” (Thompson, 1967: 53). The synthetic organization is usually 
effective (the consensus of all the members and their strong commitment make 
it very focused on the results) but not efficient. Its lack of efficiency is caused by 
the fact that, unlike “normal” organizations, the synthetic organization has to 
act and, at the same time, to structure (i.e. to give an order to) its action. Over 
time, the synthetic organization produces its own coordination rules thereby 
making the rescuers’ behavior more efficient. In this perspective, the 
organization in disaster interpreted as a continuous process of decisions and 
actions performed under conditions of bounded and purposive rationality. 
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AZF – Azote fertilisants  
AZF was a chemical factory located in Toulouse, France. The factory was 
built by the Office National Industriale de l’Azote (ONIA) in 1924. In 1928, it 
started producing nitrogen fertilizers. In the following decades, the factory 
constantly expanded its production, both in terms of figures and variety.  In 
1967, the factory changed its name into APC SA (Azote et Produits Chimiques). 
In the years between 1978 and 1983 the French chemical sector was reorganized. 
In 1983, the GdF Chimie Group gained the control over APC SA, thus creating 
the Gdf Chimie AZF (AZote Fertilisants) Group. AZF rapidly became the leader 
enterprise in the domestic nitrogen fertilizer market and enhanced its presence 
on the international markets. In 1985, the new management of the factory 
launched a plan of massive investments to enhance production processes and to 
improve productivity. It has been estimated that, between the end of the ‘70s 
and the first half of the ‘80s, AZF invested more than 1 billion Francs for process 
innovation. In 1987, AZF was acquired by the OKREM Group and was merged 
with the SCGP (Société Chimique Grande Paroisse). In 1991, the Grande 
Paroisse – AZF was acquired by ATOCHEM, the chemical branch of Elf 
Acquitaine. Finally, in April 2000, Elf Acquitaine and TotalFina announced the 
merging of all their chemical activities within Atofina. Grand Paroisse – AZF 
became the branch of Atofina (now ranked within the top five chemical groups 
in the worlds) in charge for the production of fertilizers (Bordes, 2004). 
In 2001, the AZF Toulouse plant was employing 470 people and had an 
annual turnover of about 100 million Euro. It produced nitrogen fertilizer and 
industrial nitrates. It also performed activities related to the synthesis of 
chlorine-containing compounds and the manufacturing of melamine and 
adhesives and of chlorinated products (French Ministry of the Environment, 
2002). 
To perform its activities, the factory stored considerable amounts of 
hazardous substances, in particular (Barthelemy et al., 2001; French Ministry of 
the Environment, 2002): ammonia, in two cryogenic tanks (5,000t and 1,000t) 
and in one pressurised storage tank (315t); chlorine, in two tankers (2 x 56t); 
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ammonium nitrates, 15,000t in bulk form, 15,000t in sacks, and 1,200t in hot 
liquor solution; oxidants, one tank (1,500t); methanol, one tank (2,500t). 
Additional safety concerns about AZF were caused by its location: it was 
situated on a 70ha site on the left bank of the Garonne, very close to the center 
of Toulouse (3 km).  In the ‘20s that area was suitable for chemical productions 
since it was very close to efficient transport infrastructures and it was 
sufficiently (but not excessively) close to the city. Yet, over time, the 
urbanization process had almost completely included the site within the city 
boundaries: hospitals, universities and residential and commercial areas have 
slowly surrounded the factory. 
 
Risk management at AZF 
Because of both the characteristics of the production processes performed 
in the factory and the short distance from largely inhabited areas, AZF was 
considered a sensible site and was forced to develop integrated strategies for 
preventing and mitigating risks and operative plans for recovering from 
disasters.  
In particular, the AZF plant was subject to the French legislation on 
“classified installations for the protection of environment under the 
authorization regime” (legislation set out in the law of the 19th July 1976 – then 
included in the Part I of the Book V of the Environment Code). This legislation 
submits hazardous installations to a prefectoral authorization. Such 
authorization is granted only “if these hazards or disadvantages can be 
prevented by the measures specified in the prefectoral order” (L. 511-2). The 
safety procedures to be applied are detailed by the decree of 21st September 
1977. Over time, the Inspectorate of Classified Installations performed regular 
inspections of the AZF plant, investigating storage facilities, reviewing 
environment protection procedures, and analyzing the hazard studies’ reports 
and the whole safety system. 
In addition, the AZF plant was subject to the “Seveso I and II directives”, 
a European law (82/501/EEC, 96/82/EC) aimed at preventing major-accident 
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hazards involving dangerous substances and limiting the consequences of such 
accidents. The Seveso I Directive forced enterprises to perform hazard studies 
and imposed continuous inspections and communication activities. It was 
replaced in 1996 by the Seveso II Directive. The new directive extends the range 
of applicability of the legislation and imposes the definition of more detailed 
hazard studies and their re-examination every five years. In addition, 
enterprises are required to set up a risk management system in which safety 
solution are proportioned to the all the possible major accidents they are 
exposed to. Finally, the Seveso II Directive imposes to local authorities to 
consider, while planning the land use, the risk related with major accidents.  
In 1988, the Toulouse authorities passed a General Interest Project (PIG – 
Projet d’Intérêt Général), a land using plan defining the perimeter inside which 
urban development was strictly regulated. However, “inside the lethal effect 
zone [...] (900 m), there were 1,130 inhabitants and 16,000 inside the irreversible 
effect zone (1,600 m)” (Dechy et al., 2004: 131-132).  
At the same time, local authorities and AZF agreed on a Special 
Intervention Plan (PPI – Plan Particulier d’Intervention) containing a set of 
procedures for protecting the residents. The PPI detailed procedures for the 
triggering of alarms, for the coordination of internal and external emergency 
services, for the treatments for injured people, for the interventions on traffic 
and communications infrastructures, etc. The general public was made aware of 
these safety procedures by means of mass media and by direct communications: 
for example, over 20,000 letters were sent to inform the population about risks 
and procedures to be fulfilled in the event of an alarm. 
Hence, the activities performed by AZF were tightly regulated in terms 
of working conditions, risk management and quality management. Many 
information and communication campaigns were carried out to achieve internal 
and external awareness about security policies and procedures. AZF assessed 
its risks by means of the root-cause analysis method: the analysis was designed 
to allow the recognition of major risks, the identification of the possible causes, 
and the development of coherent auditing policies and emergency procedures. 
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Various accident scenarios were envisaged, taking into account internal and 
external contingencies (weather, natural disasters, etc.): “for the Grande 
Paroisse [AZF] factory the worst scenario is the instantaneous rupture of a 
chlorine tanker (outside the discharge room) which gives distances of more 
than 2,500 m for the threshold of lethal effects and more than 5,000 m for the 
threshold of irreversible effects” (Barthelemy et al., 2001: 19). 
The internal procedures for mitigating hazardous accidents were 
formalized in the Internal Operation Plan (POI – Plan d’Opération Interne). The 
main objective of the POI was to contain and control the extension of internal 
accidents, preventing hazardous contingencies from contaminating external 
areas. The POI was regulating the whole emergency system of the AZF plant 
and it was strictly coordinated with the PPI in order to allow a coherent 
escalation of the disaster response behavior. 
The AZF plant had a standing group of private firemen ensuring, 
24h/24, the security of workers and installations. The firemen were equipped 
and trained to deal with hazardous materials, and to be able to mitigate 
accidents in accordance with the security procedures. In the ‘90s, AZF 
established an organizational task force gathering safety and medical experts, 
the “cellule d’hygiène industrielle”, introduced to develop and manage hygiene 
and safety systems for controlling the processes employing hazardous 
materials.  Overall, AZF employed 25 people with safety-specific tasks: in 
addition to twenty firemen, there were two persons in charge of risk prevention 
and safety management, one in charge of environment protection, a chief 
engineer and his assistant in charge of production safety. The emergency staff 
and the greatest part of the equipment were situated in a building located close 
to Gate A, in a safe area far away from any sensible installation. This building 
housed the situation room from where emergency operations would have been 
managed. The situation room was equipped with a phone (“red phone”) 
directly connected with the prefecture, with the local authorities in charge for 
the rescue activities (police, firemen, hospitals, etc.), and with the media; it also 
stored all the books and the reports explaining the emergency procedures. 
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Finally, Gate A was the place identified for the summoning and the 
organization of external rescuers in case of emergency. 
The procedures defined in POI and PPI were constantly analyzed and 
improved. On the third Wednesday every month, AZF internal staff simulated 
an accident and the related mitigation activities. Once per year, a large-scale 
emergency drill was organized in liaison with firemen and police; then, a 
debriefing was convened for the assessment of rescue performances and the 
identification of improvements on coordination procedures. 
The process of "construction" of safety rules in AZF has been analyzed by 
Terssac and Mignard (2011); the two authors detailed the organizational 
activities related to the development of safety rules and showed how the focus 
on safety had become a central and shared issue within the plant. 
Periodically (twice a  year), Atofina gathered all the top managers of its 
factories to discuss the safety solutions implemented, to evaluate risk 
management reports, and to exchange experiences. Within the Atofina Group, 
AZF had an excellent reputation with regard to safety management. 
 
The disaster and the organization of rescue activities 
Despite all the efforts devoted to risk management and safety, on 21 
September 2001, at 10.17 am, a terrible explosion occurred in the AZF plant.  
The explosion originated from a downgraded ammonium nitrates store, the 
hangar 221, which contained between 300 and 400 t of products. It produced a 
crater measuring 40 meters in diameter and 7 meters in depth, and originated a 
seismic wave estimated at 3.4 on the Richter scale. It has been estimated that the 
TNT equivalent mass of the explosion was in a range of 20-40 t of TNT. At the 
moment of the explosion, 266 employees and 100 agents from sub-contracting 
companies were on the site. 
The explosion devastated the northern part of the plant, but fortunately it 
did not initiate any domino effect: “the consequences of the explosion in terms 
of human loss of life and injury could have been much more serious if a storage 
facility housing toxic products had been seriously damaged or if a tanker of 
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chlorine or ammonia had been located near the area where the explosion 
occurred and had been damaged” (Barthelemy et al., 2001: 7). In the same way, 
the explosion caused heavy damages but did not initiated domino effects at 
SNPE, a weapons manufacturing company located 500 m away from AZF. The 
shock wave of the explosion hit Toulouse damaging buildings and injuring 
people up to 7 km away. More than 25.000 buildings were damaged. 
The accident caused the death of 30 people, 22 inside AZF and 8 outside. 
According to the Haute-Garonne Prefecture, 2,442 people were hospitalised, 30 
of them being seriously injured.  Injuries included mutilations, pierced 
eardrums, pleura damages, contusions, etc. More than 8,000 people consulted 
their general practitioner for acute post-traumatic stress, while about 5,000 
persons needed psychotropic treatments (French Ministry of the Environment, 
2002; INVS, 2006; Terssac, Gaillard, 2008). 
Hangar 221 was located very close (25 m) to gate A and to the emergency 
building (Figure 1), hence the explosion swept away all the emergency 
infrastructures and killed or injured most of the emergency staff.  
 
Figure 1: The site. 
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Inside the AZF plant, employees tried to follow the procedures, as 
defined by the POI, arresting the hazardous installations placed in the southern 
part and getting to the predefined summoning points. However, since the 
emergency staff was missing, emergency activities were slowed down. The 
northern part of the plant was almost completely destroyed and was being 
flooded by ammonium nitrate contained in the hangars surrounding the hangar 
221. No one had a clear understanding of the situation. The explosion of a 
“safe” building and the lack of coordination prevented a consistent disaster 
response. Furthermore, none of the survivors succeeded in getting in contact 
with the public authorities, mainly because the public communication networks 
were overwhelmed by the emergency calls from the city. Moreover, “the 
information to the population was not possible without the buzzer (did not 
work) or the radio. In a case of a domino effect on a toxic gas storage, the 
confinement of the emergency action with broken windows was not ensured” 
(Dechy et al., 2004: 135). 
Outside the plant, emergency services heard the explosion and witnessed 
the effects on the city, but were not notified by AZF. They could not have any 
information about the source and the causes of the disaster. Additionally, the 
shock wave damaged the radio infrastructure, temporarily hindering 
emergency communications (e.g. the radio system of the firemen was 
malfunctioning for about ten minutes from the explosion). 
Firefighters teams standing in their stations were initially dispatched to 
the urban area to assist injured people. Many of the teams already out for 
interventions autonomously decided to help the people in Toulouse, without 
following the formal rule stating the preliminary summoning of the firemen to 
their base stations. Chaos and lack of information inhibited a rational response 
to the disaster. Then, about twenty minutes after the explosion, a fireman not in 
active duty transmitted a message communicating the source and the relevance 
of the explosion; as soon as such information was received, many emergency 
teams headed directly to the AZF site, without waiting for specific orders and 
without being equipped for dealing with hazardous materials. The “red plan” 
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(i.e. the emergency plan elaborated by the fire brigade for dealing with 
catastrophic events) could not be applied because of both the massive amount 
of damages in a very large area and the lack of operational coordination among 
emergency teams (Kanzari, Thoemmes, 2008). 
Within thirty minutes from the explosion, the first external rescuers 
reached the AZF plant. In accordance with the formal procedures defined by 
the Special Intervention Plan (PPI), they tried to get to Gate A (the place 
designated for the summoning with the internal teams), but they found it not 
viable. Hence, they had to move toward Gate C, but they were hindered by the 
chaotic traffic reigning on the Route d’Espagne, the road running on the West 
side of the plant. Finally, when they succeeded in reaching the Gate C, they 
could not meet the AZF emergency team; instead, they met a large number of 
shocked and injured people. The rescue operations started immediately: the 
firemen tried to get to the northern part of the site, even if they were not 
coherently equipped. Fortunately, the substances freed by the explosion did not 
present any relevant hazard.  Soon, rescue teams were organized in order to 
remove debris and to try to save injured people. 
In a short time, many volunteer firefighters, as well as many firefighters 
not in active duty, reached the site of the explosion. Their efforts were 
obviously helpful; however, they contributed to increase chaos and disorder. 
Within one hour from the explosion, the emergency teams that had 
followed the rule imposing to rejoin in the base station and to wait for orders 
were mobilized. Most of them were dispatched to AZF, while others were 
ordered to help the population in Toulouse. Teams specialized in hazardous 
material detection and confinement were also mobilized.  
The Prefecture had many problems in coordinating the rescue activities 
and in dispatching rescue teams in the various locations: in fact, it was very 
difficult even to have a precise picture of the available resources, since the rule 
stating the regrouping  of the emergency teams was not widely applied. At this 
time, the lack of information about the nature of the explosion and the 
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possibility to be dealing with an incumbent chemical disaster made relief efforts 
very problematic.  
In addition, the news of an explosion at AZF shocked the population: 
they were aware of the risk of chemical  releases from the factory and, 
furthermore, and they were fearing to be experiencing a situation similar to the 
one they watched on television ten days before (when the Twin Towers 
collapsed because of suicide terrorist attacks). Panic was mounting. City 
hospitals and medical services were already running over their capacity, while 
the number of intervention requests was overwhelming. 
During the first six hours from the explosion, the main concern of the 
rescue teams in AZF was to help injured people while assessing the 
environmental impact and securing hazardous installations. An emergency 
medical center was created in a safe building, thus becoming the hub for 
victims and incoming ambulances. By 1.00 pm, relief efforts were becoming 
more tightly coordinated by means of the POI, the PPI, and the red plan 
implemented by the fire brigade. Taking advantage of activity reports and 
entry/exit records available in the factory, the rescuers were able to compile a 
list of missing people and to assess their position in the site at the moment of 
the explosion. In the meanwhile, a considerable number of reinforcements 
(from the nearby regions and from Bordeaux and Paris) were reaching the AZF 
plant: in a few hours, more than 1,400 additional rescuers began working on the 
site. The efficiency of the operations improved and, by 5.00 pm, the emergency 
could be considered stabilized. However, relief efforts continued for 24 hours. 
The PPI remained in charge until September 28. The most important activities 
for securing the site ended in December 2001. 
Overall, the relief process succeeded in achieving its objectives, i.e. 
saving lives and protecting the environment; however, during the first two 
hours from the disaster, the relief organization was not efficient, and the 
preliminary plans regulating emergency operations were not widely applied. 
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The failure of foresight 
Hangar 221 was a temporary storage of downgraded (off-specs) 
ammonium nitrate produced by the different process units of the plant. It 
housed materials considered below-grade (because of their size or their 
chemical composition) or returned from customers. From the various 
workshops of the site, off-specs materials were transported and provisionally 
stored in hangar 221. The warehouse, though quite old, was in fair conditions, 
and had not gas or electricity supplies. Periodically, downgraded materials 
were removed from the warehouse and were sent to other plants of the Atofine 
Group in order to be recycled. The transportation of these materials was 
operated by truck, without applying any particular safety measure.  
Even after the AZF explosion, it is unclear how dangerous ammonium 
nitrate is: “[…] ammonium nitrate must be regarded as an explosive substance 
since, under certain conditions where it is mixed with combustible compounds 
or catalysts and with a fairy strong source of energy or in event of confinement, 
it may detonate. This risk is relatively small since it requires a fairly strong 
source of energy to cause a detonation so that usually the product is consumed 
more or less quickly”  (Barthelemy et al., 2001: 10).  
The cause of the explosion is still unknown. Several investigations and 
inquiries have raised hypotheses to explain the explosion, in particular (French 
Ministry of the Environment, 2002: 11): unintentional external causes (methane 
due to bacterial activity, meteorite, falling aircraft parts, explosion following 
previous site activity); intentional external causes (terrorist attack, mischief, 
missile); industrial process accident (internal electrical fault at the plant, electric 
arc, missile effect from a part projected at high speed); chemical reaction in 
hangar 221 (because of the mixture of incompatible chemical substances). 
Whatever the cause was, it is remarkable that the risk assessment studies 
previously developed and the public and internal inspections had never raised 
any particular concern about hangar 221. It was simply considered “not 
sensible”: “whilst the risk from fire was contemplated on this type of storage 
facility, the risk of explosion was considered by the operator to be negligible” 
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(Barthelemy et al., 2001: 5). More in general, the whole northern part of the site 
was considered safe, hence emergency services were placed there. 
Even the regular inspections performed by the Inspector of Classified 
Installations did not found any particular problem in the northern area of the 
plant: “the inspections carried out had been focused, as was quite normal, on 
those installations deemed to be the most hazardous, which in the case of the 
Grande Paroisse meant the storage facilities for toxic products (chlorine and 
ammonia), and the implementation of the new provisions of the Seveso II 
Directive” (Barthelemy et al., 2001: 22). The last supervisory inspection of AZF 
took place on May 2001 and was focused on the hazard studies and on the 
safety management system. 
Tight regulation, hazard assessment studies, risk management 
techniques, periodical inspections, reiterated emergency drills, and analytical 
emergency plans simply did not succeed in preventing or limiting the effect of a 
contingency in building 221. Furthermore, it was just by chance (i.e. because of 
the lack of a domino effect on sensible installations) that the disaster did not 
originate a terrible catastrophe. Even the rescue procedures, formalized in the 
Special Intervention Plan, were not managed efficiently, though they proved to 
be effective. Additional problems affecting rescue operations in the AZF case 
were redundancy of efforts, rivalry in the emergency management, low degree 
of communication, and myopia about the general framework of the situation. 
The problem is very relevant since AZF was meeting all the dictates 
imposed by national and international laws and was applying state-of-the-art 
risk management techniques; in addition, the management of the factory had 
always shown a strong commitment toward safety and risk management.  
Based on the current state of improvement of theory and practice, how to 
avoid similar accidents or, to limit their consequences or, at least, to efficiently 
manage relief efforts?  
Political reactions to the AZF disaster were headed toward the 
improvement of the regulation around at-risk sites and the strengthening of 
hazard studies (with regards to accident scenarios, failure of safety systems, 
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domino effects) and of risk confinement solutions (back-ups, double 
confinement of toxic substances, etc.) (Salvi, Dechy, 2005; Salvi et al. 2005), will 
it suffice? 
 
Discussion 
Depending on the theoretical framework adopted, the analysis of actual 
cases allows different interpretations. This is clearly shown by the AZF case. 
Positivist theories would emphasize pitfalls and incongruences in the 
planning process developed by AZF and local authorities. In fact, they presume 
that, if coherent risk assessment analysis and correct planning are implemented, 
the disaster recovery activities can be run efficiently. In this case, in particular, 
the people in charge of the risk analysis process failed in understanding the 
potential risk arising from hangar 221. Such mistake, legitimated by 
“distracted” inspectors, provoked an incorrect development of risk 
management plans and an incoherent predisposition of emergency procedures 
(both internally and externally). In other words, the mistake is in the human 
being, not in the system.  
However, considering ICS techniques, we have to wonder whether they 
could have been useful in Toulouse. In effect, it is questionable that an ICS 
would have had superior performances in the post-disaster crisis: because of 
the failure of the alarm communication systems, it is likely that the ICS could 
have not been able to escalate and to organize itself better and more efficiently 
than the PPI/POI system. In fact, in Toulouse, rescuers failed to recognize the 
source of the explosion and to understand the nature and the size of the 
disaster; furthermore, they could not even communicate efficiently. Overall, as 
noted by Clark and Short (1993: 380), “the normative theory behind this line of 
thought hold that if only the reality can be ascertained, prescriptions for action 
will be self evident. While no one would deny we need more and better 
information, the view has major problems. One is the assumption, palpably 
false, that information can resolve value conflicts. Another is that organizations 
often have too much, not too little, information available in decision situations”. 
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From the point of view of improvisation/bricolage theories, we can 
consider the explosion as a “cosmology episode”, i.e. an episode that occurs 
“when people suddenly and deeply feel that the universe is no longer a 
rational, orderly system. What it makes such an episode so shattering is that 
both the sense of what is occurring and the means to rebuild the sense collapse 
together” (Weick, 1993: 633). AZF employees, residents, and emergency staff 
lost their system of legitimate meanings and had to collectively initiate a new 
sensemaking process. Hence, only the bricolage and improvisation skills shown 
by people and by the rescuers prevented the AZF explosion from resulting in a 
terrible disaster. 
The main problem affecting the organization of the relief efforts was, 
from this perspective, the excessive formalization imposed by Seveso directives 
and by local authorities: formal definition and coordination of tasks may in fact 
stimulate the development of a counter-intuitive system of anti-tasks by which 
unintended consequences are disseminated along the organization (Turner, 
1978). According to this point of view, the planning and prevention process 
should be less focused on formal, tangible regulation and more oriented at 
influencing the socialization of common values and cultures to facilitate 
improvisation and coherent sensemaking in crisis situations.  
From a different perspective, based on bounded rationality, the 
organization of rescue activities in Toulouse may be interpreted as a “synthetic 
organization” developing its order over time. In the following paragraphs, we 
are describing the major processes of decisions and actions performed during 
the crisis.  
Immediately after the explosion in hangar 221, survivors followed the 
procedures stated in the POI and reached the summoning points. However, the 
formal chain of command and control had been ravaged by the explosion, 
hence many of the emergency procedures could not be performed (e.g. 
informing the local authorities, coordinating relief activities with external 
emergency services, etc.) and the coordination of survivors could not be based 
on standard rules. Anyway, survivors tried to apply emergency procedures (in 
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particular, they immediately attempted to secure hazardous installations to 
prevent domino effects) and someone autonomously decided to move toward 
the disaster area to help injured colleagues. Rescuers acted in small groups 
coordinating themselves by mutual adjustment (e.g. by speech and gesture), 
and without the support of predefined routines. 
In the meanwhile, the emergency services (such as civil defence, police, 
fire department, medical service) located in Toulouse mobilized and planned 
the rescue activities. The situation was chaotic; no one had a clear 
understanding of the general relief framework. Requests for interventions were 
arriving from almost everywhere in the city. 
When the first information about the origin of the explosion reached the 
rescuers in Toulouse, they immediately tried to direct their efforts toward AZF. 
Their main problem was related to the definition of extent and characteristics of 
the emergency. Furthermore, they had to decide about the nature and the 
amount of the resources to be sent, about the locations where to dispatch the 
rescue teams and about the way resources may take to reach these destinations. 
In addition, they were forced to modularize their efforts in order to 
simultaneously help people in AZF and Toulouse inhabitants. Moreover, the 
breakdown of the communication system did not allow a consistent 
coordination among prefecture, police, firemen, and medical services.  
The rationality of the rescuers’ decision-making process was not 
absolute: they did not succeed in understanding the whole crisis situation, 
many emergency teams acted autonomously, unnecessary equipment was 
dispatched, etc. However, the behavior of the rescuers was not random or 
erratic, instead, it was purposive and direct: they were using the information 
and the means at hand in order to achieve their immediate goal. 
As soon as large numbers of “professional” rescuers arrived on the AZF 
site, the relief efforts become more orderly. Professional and volunteer rescuers 
worked in teams coordinated by a group of people able to collect information 
about critical needs and about resources availability. A local headquarter was 
established to enable more efficient information flows, the Special Intervention 
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Plan (PPI) was applied for regulating relief efforts, for setting communication 
standards, and for elaborating coordination plans; in addition, the availability 
of additional information allowed a more detailed definition of the intervention 
priorities. In a few hours, the organization of the relief activities achieved a 
satisfactory level of order.  
The behavior of the rescuers, now coordinated also by means of the rules 
elaborated by the emergency authorities, was becoming more and more 
coherent with the relief objectives. Duplication of efforts was virtually 
overcome, primary support was ensured to all the disaster-affected people, and 
hazardous installations were secured. 
 
Primary prevention and risk management 
As shown by the AZF case, the rescue activities, interpreted as a 
synthetic organization, can never be completely efficient. As Thompson (1967:  
53-54) points out, “it can be presumed that efficiency would be higher if the 
synthetic-organization headquarters knew in advance either the extent of the 
problem to be solved or the full array of resources available to it, and that 
maximum efficiency would be achieved if both were known in advance. Under 
those conditions it could plan, establish relevant rules, and provide 
communication channels among its departments”. However, under conditions 
of bounded rationality, it is simply impossible to foresee all the possible future 
contingencies affecting a system. Routines and plans are useful, but just as 
decision premises: the rescue decision-making process may benefit of reliable 
experience formalized in rules, but it evolves depending on the actual situation. 
Hence, the process of decisions and actions is continuously evolving, creating 
and re-creating its order (i.e. its behavioral rules) coherently with the evolution 
of its objectives and with its comprehension of the rescue technology (Maggi, 
2003).  
The peculiar importance attributed by this approach to preliminary plans 
and procedures may also call for a different planning process. In fact, 
traditional emergency and disaster planning is aimed at capturing the 
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complexities of the real world for identifying and managing risks; in case of 
failure, emergency plans propose detailed recovery procedures. Such an 
approach is unrealistic, as empirical evidence shows: it is neither able to 
prevent disaster, nor to propose efficient disaster-recovery procedures. 
From this perspective, human beings are not able (because of their 
bounded rationality) to design and manage fully safe systems. Even the concept 
of high reliability organization is misleading: since “HRO studies interpret the 
absence of low frequency events (such as meltdowns) as evidence of high 
reliability” (Clarke, Short, 1993: 390): in the end, until 21 September 2001, AZF 
was a high reliability organization… 
In fact, most of the current risk management strategies can be considered 
as secondary prevention, i.e. they aim at reducing the probability of an accident, 
while disaster recovery plans seek to reduce the seriousness of injuries resulting 
from accidents (Ashford et al., 1993; Misomali, McEntire, 2010). In general 
terms, we may define risk management as “the process of reducing the risks to 
a level deemed tolerable by society and to assure control, monitoring, and 
public communication” (Renn, 1998: 51); risk management is generally 
implemented by means of detailed risk assessment analysis, of predefined risk 
mitigation strategies, and of formal relief and recovery procedures 
(Appelbaum, 1977; Morgan, 1990). Such strategies are trying to predict the 
classes of risk and to prevent them by limiting and controlling the identified 
initiating causes. In the same way, detailed contingency plans are developed in 
order to mitigate the impact of disasters. 
From a bounded rationality perspective, the global focus on risk 
management and disaster recovery is a losing game: there will always be 
unmanaged risks, while managed risks may provoke unintended accidents and 
disastrous consequences.   
Hence, secondary prevention and mitigation strategies are, by 
themselves, unable to eliminate the risk of catastrophes: “our response to the 
three sources of disasters needs to be something more than attending to 
preparation, response, and mitigation, we need to do more than improving the 
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functioning of our existing organizations; our efforts there can only result in 
minimal improvements” (Perrow, 2007: 292).  
Risk management strategies originate from the risk and try to control it; 
in other words, they accept the risk, they take it for granted. Perrow (2007) 
suggests that risk management, by itself, may also create additional risk: for 
instance, when a territory is exposed to floods, it may invest in shoring up 
levees (i.e. in managing the risk); such an investment may succeed in protecting 
from normal risks but, when it happens an exceptional flood, the levees will 
probably fail thus provoking even higher damages. Another way for dealing 
with the flood risk can be based on the proactive elimination of the risk: for 
instance, before or in addition to the levees it could be  more useful to 
implement solutions to avoid the risk of floods (e.g. by creating new storage 
and conveyance space, or by developing more refined hydro-geological 
policies). 
Evidently, in addition to choices related to secondary prevention, it is 
possible to envisage strategies that are based on the active pursuit of safety, 
understood as a state of absence of danger: this approach is called primary 
prevention. 
Hence, governments and enterprises should preliminarily focus on 
primary prevention approaches, relying on strategies to prevent the possibility 
of an accident (Figure 2) (Maggi, 1984/1990, 2003; Ashford et al., 1993; Perrow, 
2007): it means reducing vulnerabilities instead of managing risks, adopting 
inherently safer production technologies instead of tightly controlling 
production processes, storing minimal quantities of hazardous materials 
instead of double-confining enormous tanks of hazard materials, etc. In other 
words, “first of all, it is necessary to envisage the possibility to work for 
avoiding and eliminating the risk, the strategies for limiting the consequences 
of prevention failures being a logically successive task” (Maggi, 2003: 162). Risk 
management activities are then necessary, but they are successive and 
subordinate to the attempts aimed at eliminating the risk. 
 
FRANCESCO M. BARBINI, THE FAILURE OF FORESIGHT IN MANAGING RISKS  
TAO DIGITAL LIBRARY - 2015 27 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The causal structure of hazard (Adapted from Ashford et al., 1993: II-
2). 
 
Obviously, the application of primary prevention strategies does not 
overcome the necessity of secondary and tertiary prevention. In fact, since 
bounded rationality prevents decision makers from eliminating all the risks, 
then such risks must be managed and limited. Primary prevention should be 
considered as a preliminary, fundamental process to be continuously 
performed and refined; it should also be integrated and coordinated with risk 
management and mitigation strategies. 
Primary prevention strategies can be applied to any source of disasters 
(Perrow, 2007) and require a wholly different application techniques, in 
particular in enterprises: “industrial firms typically regard safety (as well 
workers health and environmental concerns) as an objective to be satisfied 
separate from, but consistent with, production output and efficiency. […] Safety 
responsibility is usually given to safety professionals expert at secondary 
prevention, but not particularly expert at process design or choice of material 
inputs. The safety decisions are viewed as the choice among possible (usually 
off-the-shelf) risk-reducing technologies and practices, not the choice of 
inherently safe technologies” (Ashford et al., 1993: V-1).  
Under conditions of bounded rationality, indeed, the responsibility for 
primary prevention should not be allocated to management staff; instead it 
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should become a proactive process involving all the workers. At the end, safety 
management would require modifications to the labor processes, from their 
conception to their execution (Maggi, 2003; 2010). Real-world applications of 
primary prevention strategies, such those described in literature (Maggi, 
1984/1990; 2003; Maggi, Rulli, 2010), proved to be viable and effective. 
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Introduction 
Cooperation is one of the most debated topics by contemporary 
Organization Theory; it is often combined and confused with concepts like 
“interdependence” and “coordination”, and is widely investigated and 
analyzed. Interfirm networks, Internet/ICT-supported collaboration, 
outsourcing and off-shoring, knowledge networks, social networks, team-
working, human resource development are among the most relevant themes 
involving the concept of cooperation. 
This contribution is proposing an organizational discourse to understand 
and explain the problems and inefficiencies affecting cooperative behavior. The 
analysis is developed by investigating the most important facts related to the 
international relief process carried out in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami. In particular, it is focusing on the cooperation and coordination 
problems arising in post-disaster rescue processes. From an organizational 
point of view, it is important to understand how the subjects involved in the 
relief process cooperate and coordinate their behavior to effectively meet the 
needs of disaster-affected people. To this end, the tsunami case study is to be 
considered a magnifying glass allowing to point out the cooperation and 
coordination problems arising in every collective behavior.  
First of all, the tsunami case will be described and the major cooperative 
problems related to rescue processes will be highlighted. Then, basing on 
available literature, the concepts of cooperation and coordination will be 
explained and declined with a focus on humanitarian emergencies. Finally, a 
framework for studying cooperative issues will be introduced and applied for 
explaining the events occurred in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami. 
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The case study has been drawn up by means of an extensive desk survey. 
News and official situation reports (covering the period between 26 December 
2004 and the end of January 2005) have been analyzed in order to reconstruct 
the flow of the events and the most relevant facts related to international 
coordination. In addition, a review of post-disaster official reports and 
documents (mainly issued by the United Nations or by independent bodies) has 
been carried out. 
 
Disasters and the international relief system 
Humanity has always been forced to cope with disasters. Along the 
centuries, hurricanes, droughts, earthquakes, epidemics, famines, floods, 
population movements, volcanic eruptions, blazes have been influencing the 
evolution, the history, and, ultimately, the survival of humankind. A large 
number of analysis have been carried out (by geologists, social scientists, 
geographers, policy-makers, historicists, sociologists, psychologists, military 
forces, economists, environmental analysts, etc.) to investigate the impact of 
disasters on the different spheres of a community, to predict and prevent 
disastrous events, to make the post-disaster recovery process more efficient 
(Fritz, 1961; Turner, 1976; Turner, Pidgeon, 1997; Quarantelli, 1998; Perrow, 
2007). 
On a global scale, disaster relief activities are carried out by international 
agencies, by national disaster-ready institutions (civil defence departments), by 
non-profit, voluntary entities (Non-Governmental Organizations, NGOs). The 
main international agencies usually involved in complex relief activities are the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and International Organization for 
Migration (IOM). Moreover, a continuously growing number of international, 
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governmental or voluntary bodies are involved in post-disaster relief and 
recovery activities.  
Such entities act almost independently, deciding their own priorities and 
their intervention strategies. Consequently, international relief activities are 
usually managed and carried out by a large number of institutions, playing 
both complementary and concurrent roles: in case of large emergencies, this 
autonomous attitude is very likely to result in duplication of efforts, relief 
ineffectiveness, and in a low rationality of behaviors. The lack of strategic and 
operative coordination among institutions usually results also in low efficiency 
and, sometimes, in low effectiveness. For instance, for the 1999 Kosovo crisis, 
donor countries acted unilaterally, without operational coordination: each 
country built its own refugee camp and conveyed there forces and resources. 
The United Nations played a marginal, secondary role. This “chaotic” approach 
resulted in heavy redundancy of efforts, and, in general, in a poor quality of the 
humanitarian intervention. In the same year, the United Nations directly and 
tightly coordinated the relief efforts for the emergency in Timor East. In this 
case, the international cooperative action was more effective, and the 
emergency was stabilized in a relatively short time. Redundancy of efforts, 
rivalry in funds allocation and management, low degree of communication, and 
myopia about the general framework of the situation are then typical problems 
arising in complex emergencies, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami. 
The present configuration of the humanitarian system was established on 
19 December 1991, when the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
recognizing the need for higher international coordination in case of 
humanitarian emergencies (mainly as a consequence of the UN  system’s 
inability to operate effectively during the 1991 Kurdish crisis), passed the 
Resolution 46/182 (“Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian 
emergency assistance of the United Nations”).  The resolution reaffirmed the 
responsibility and the primary role of the disaster-affected States in the 
initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian 
assistance within their territory (Resolution 46/182, title I par.4). In addition, it 
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assigned to the United Nations a pivotal role in providing leadership and 
coordinating the efforts of the international community to support the affected 
countries (Resolution 46/182, title I par.12). To this end, the Resolution 
instituted the high-level position of Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), with 
the status of Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. The ERC was 
charged of the coordination of international relief activities in case of 
humanitarian emergencies. Inter alia, the ERC had the following responsibilities 
(Resolution 46/182, title VI par.35): (a) processing requests from affected 
member states for emergency assistance requiring a coordinated response; (b) 
organizing, in consultation with the government of the affected country, joint 
inter-agency needs-assessment missions; (c) serving as a central focal point with 
governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations 
concerning United Nations emergency relief operations; (d) actively promoting, 
in close collaboration with concerned organizations, the smooth transition from 
relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction as relief operations under his aegis are 
phased out.  
The resolution 46/182 also instituted the UN Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) to mobilize and coordinate the collective efforts of 
the international community and introduced a committee for the promotion of 
the coordination among international relief agencies (Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee – IASC), both chaired by the ERC. The DHA was designed to 
“mobilize and coordinate the collective efforts of the international community, 
in particular those of the UN system, to meet in a coherent and timely manner 
the needs of those exposed to human suffering and material destruction in 
disasters and emergencies”, while the IASC was intended as a crucial forum for 
humanitarian dialogue and decision-making, bringing together all 
humanitarian partners directly involved in specific relief interventions. IASC 
was aimed at shaping humanitarian policy and ensuring coordinated and 
effective response. United Nations, International Organizations, Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement and representatives of NGOs were convened as 
permanent members of the IASC. Finally, the Resolution introduced the figure 
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of the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator, as a central coordinator of 
emergency preparedness and assistance at national level. 
In 1998, within the framework of a global institutional reform of the 
United Nations, the DHA changed its name into Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In addition, OCHA’s coordination functions 
were emphasized by transferring many of its operational attributions to other 
UN agencies and by enforcing its responsibilities related to the advocacy for 
human rights (OCHA, 2000). Having lost its operative attributions, OCHA 
ceased to be a “player in the field” during emergencies, thus becoming able to 
play a super-partes role, coordinating the action of the institutions directly 
involved in the relief process. In addition, thanks its new linkages with both the 
higher directional offices of the UN and the national governments, OCHA was 
now in a position strong enough to promote integrated and holistic (i.e. 
politically and, if the case, military supported) interventions in areas afflicted 
by humanitarian emergencies (OCHA, 2000; 2006). Since 2004, OCHA has two 
headquarters: one in New York (which is in charge of the relationships with the 
political organs of the UN and of the management of emergencies provoked by 
natural disasters) and the other in Geneva (in charge of the management of 
complex emergencies). The mission of OCHA is to mobilize and coordinate 
humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors to 
alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies, to advocate for the 
rights of victims, to promote preparedness and prevention, and to facilitate 
sustainable solutions (OCHA, 2008). OCHA’s main intervention body is IASC, 
which is convened and headed by ERC. ERC may also deploy other rapid-
response bodies, such as the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams 
(UNDAC), International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), and 
the Geographic Information Support Team (GIST). 
With reference to information sharing among emergency agencies, the 
United Nations deploys three tools: the IRINnews (Integrated Regional 
Information Network), a humanitarian news and analysis service; the 
Humanitarian Information Centre, an emergency-specific, data-exchange 
F.M. BARBINI, COOPERATION AND GOAL CONFLICTS IN CRISIS SITUATIONS 
TAO DIGITAL LIBRARY - 2015 34 
platform; and the ReliefWeb web-based information systems aimed at 
harvesting and sharing information about emergencies and relief activities. In 
particular, ReliefWeb was launched by OCHA in 1996. In 1997, the General 
Assembly of the United States passed Resolution 51/194, endorsing the creation 
of the system and encouraging the widespread adoption of ReliefWeb as 
standard information systems for emergency management. Today, ReliefWeb is 
“an independent vehicle of information, designed specifically to assist the 
international humanitarian community in effective delivery of emergency 
assistance, it provides timely, reliable and relevant information as events 
unfold, while emphasizing the coverage of forgotten emergencies at the same 
time” (ReliefWeb web site). In 2002, its web site (www.reliefweb.int) received 
1,5 million hits per week, in 2004 it reached 1 million hits a day, during the 
Indian Ocean tsunami emergency it received 3 million hits a day on average; in 
the first two months following the tsunami, ReliefWeb published more than 
4.000 documents and 90 maps on the disaster. The number of ReliefWeb 
information partners is continuously growing (from 250 in 1996, to 800 in 2001, 
and to more than 2.500 in 2007), as well as the amount of information managed 
by the system (Naidoo, 2007).    
Globally, the international relief system is complex and multiform, and it 
is characterized by high dynamicity (mainly caused by the continuous 
proliferation of NGOs) and low inter-institutional communication. 
The coordination of such a large and varied web of entities is the main 
task of OCHA, which operates by collecting information from the various 
sources in the field, elaborating such information, identifying core intervention 
needs, soliciting and deploying resources. Moreover, OCHA has the authority 
to convene the actors involved in the relief activities to agree shared 
intervention strategies. Finally, OCHA proposes relief routines and procedures 
and develops communication standards. 
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The Indian Ocean tsunami  
On 26 December 2004, at 7.58 am, an earthquake registered 9.0-9.3 
magnitude on the Richter scale struck the Indian Ocean. The epicenter was 
located in the Ocean, close to the West coast of northern Sumatra, 250 
kilometers South-West of Banda Aceh. The enormous energy (equivalent to that 
of thousands of Hiroshima bombs) unlashed by the quake, the stronger 
registered by seismographs in the last forty years, triggered a massive tidal 
wave (tsunami) that hit the coasts of the Indian Ocean (Titov et al., 2005). In less 
than an hour, waves moving at speed of more than 500 km/h struck Indonesia 
(provoking 167.540 people lost) and Thailand (8.212 people lost). Then, 
propagation waves reached Sri Lanka (35.322), Maldives (108), Malaysia (75), 
Myanmar (61), Bangladesh (2), India (16.269), Seychelles (2), and, seven hours 
and thousands of kilometers later, Somalia (289), Yemen (2), South Africa (1), 
Kenya (1), and Tanzania (13). 
The tsunami flooded coastal areas and destroyed or damaged houses, 
buildings, farms, markets, infrastructures, and water and electricity supplies 
(OCHA, 2006). Entire costal ecosystems were wiped away. The flood left more 
than 5 million people without primary resources, with their own survival 
threatened. The total damage provoked by the tsunami was estimated at about 
US$ 10 billion (TGLLPSC, 2009). The official number of people killed by the 
earthquake and the following tsunami is unknown, however, it is estimated at 
about 228.000. In addition to the 14 affected countries, 40 other countries 
reported dead or missing citizens.  
In terms of death toll, the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster was not the 
worst humanitarian emergency of our time (for instance, in 1970, the storm 
surge in the Bay of Bengal killed 300.000 to 500.000, in 1976, the Tangshan 
earthquake killed at least 242.000, and the 1974 tornado in Bangladesh killed 
400.000); however, never, in our recent history, a disaster provoked similar 
disruption in such a wide area, impacting two continents (Asia and Africa).  
Immediately, an extraordinary media coverage started (perhaps because 
of the period of the year - Christmas holidays - or because of the involvement of 
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many Western tourists), contributing to the amplification of the impact of the 
news on the public opinion. Such a relevant psychological impact on the public 
opinion paved the way to unprecedented fund-raising campaigns. In a very 
short time, US$ 13,5 billion were pledged or donated, constituting the largest 
international fund-raising campaign on record (Telford, Cosgrave 2006; 
TGLLPSC, 2009). 
In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, local people carried out the 
large majority of search and rescue activities. “Survivors were rescued by their 
neighbors and by other survivors using whatever means were at hand. 
Surviving doctors, nurses and paramedics rendered first aid in makeshift or 
remaining health facilities” (Telford, Cosgrave, 2006: 42). Rapidly, national 
agencies mobilized to support the local communities affected by the tsunami, 
trying in particular to restore hospitals and infrastructures. 
The United Nations immediately sent assessment teams to collect 
information and develop a detailed representation of the emergency. The entire 
international relief system mobilized; many national governments did the same, 
alerting their civil defence agencies and their disaster-ready institutions. NGOs 
promptly got in contact with local governments to obtain the permission to 
send men and resources in the disaster areas.  
A second (humanitarian) tsunami was approaching...  
Within the first few hours, international first aid and assessment teams 
(mainly UNDAC teams) were dispatched to the most affected areas. 
Subsequently, large international rescue forces started reaching the most 
prostrated countries with the objective of alleviating the sufferings of the 
survivors by supplying them with food, drinkable water, first aid kits, and field 
tents. International rescuers initially acted in three main directions: (a) 
sustaining and supporting the victims, (b) collecting detailed information about 
the extent of the disaster and about the resources needed by the survivors, and 
(c) defining, refining, and adopting operative routines and defining 
communication standards. Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General 
immediately appointed a Special Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to 
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the tsunami Affected Communities to provide leadership and support to the 
UN country teams and to facilitate the delivery of international assistance 
through high level consultations with the concerned governments (Bennett et 
al., 2006: 30). 
In a relatively short time, camps and health services were set up in many 
areas; however, relevant relief coordination problems emerged: the unmatched 
scale of the emergency, the lack of reliable information about the amount and 
the nature of resources needed by each country called for higher 
synchronization and modularization of the intervention. On the other hand, the 
extraordinary amount of funds made available by governments and by private 
donors generated a counter-intuitive problem: how to allocate such resources?  
Specifically, at least during the initial phase of the post-tsunami 
emergency, rescuers were forced to invert the typical procedures for the relief 
process. Usually, in fact, this process starts with the analysis of the size of the 
disaster and with the classification of the most needed resources. Then, the 
intervention is planned and resources solicited and dispatched consequently. 
This approach depicts a situation in which relief interventions are pulled by the 
victims’ actual needs. Instead, at least for the first two weeks from the tsunami, 
the relief process was managed on the basis of available resources and 
donations. In that case, available resources were “pushed” in the affected area. 
“The response was supply-led rather than demand-driven. In the initial phase 
particularly, agencies were under pressure to spend money quickly to enable 
reporting of activities to the general public” (Cosgrave, 2005: 11). 
By the eve of January, hundreds of international NGOs were working on 
the field, supporting national and international disaster-ready institutions and 
agencies. “Inappropriate aid was just as evident, however: there were 
numerous instances of duplication, as well as of the distribution of 
inappropriate goods. [...] Despite the large amounts of funding raised for the 
tsunami response, important gaps in crucial humanitarian sector persist” 
(Telford, Cosgrave, 2006: 51). Certain affected areas were overcrowded by 
rescuers, while others remained under-supported. In addition to duplication 
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and overlapping of efforts, many instances of inappropriate aid were reported, 
such as the provision of Viagra, ski jackets, expired drugs, tinned pork 
dispatched to Muslim areas, and expired food. Inappropriate or delayed aid 
frustrated the victims and provoked (besides the waste of resources) a raising 
resentment in the affected populations. 
In such a complex and chaotic situation, UN’s coordination capabilities 
were inhibited by political and operational problems. The need for coordination 
mounted. “The size and speed of this operation, and the ever growing number 
of those involved in providing assistance, make effective coordination 
absolutely critical, and we are devoting the resources we need at all levels. We 
also have to do everything we can to ensure that all of the assistance gets to 
those in need, and that none of the pledges made remain unfulfilled. (…) Today 
our greatest challenge remains how to make sure that the right kind of relief 
reaches the people who need it most” (Egeland, 2005). 
OCHA established a local Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 
Banda Aceh to support coordination by proposing standard routines and 
procedure, and to assist the Resident Coordinators / Human Coordinators who 
were overwhelmed by the size of the interventions required and the resources 
available. However, the local IASC could not gather all the stakeholders 
involved in the relief process thus suffering of under-representativeness. 
On December 29th, the President of the United States of America 
announced the establishment of a Regional Core Group (RCG) with India, 
Japan, and Australia aimed at deploying military contingents and equipment to 
support civilian-led humanitarian efforts. The RCG, lacking a reliable definition 
of the resources needed, modularized its military forces in small rapid 
intervention teams to efficiently meet the different needs of the victims. Such 
teams, helicopter transported, were able to perform rapid search-and-rescue 
missions, to dispatch everywhere food and medications, to install water-
treatment systems, to repair roads, and to restore primary communication 
infrastructures. 
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On January 6th 2005, an operative meeting for the coordination of the 
international relief efforts was held in Jakarta. Later on the same day, the 
Regional Core group disbanded: OCHA was now fully in charge for the 
coordination of relief strategies and operational decisions. The dissolution of 
Regional Core Group was justified by the need for a more integrated and 
agreed relief strategy. However, the modular and flexible military forces 
deployed by the RCG had proved very useful for supporting initial relief 
activities and, in general, reached their objectives. Based on the resolutions of 
the Jakarta meeting, OCHA launched a Flash Appeal for US$ 977 million to 
meet emergency needs of about five million people over a six-month period. 
On January 11th, the political leaders of more than 80 countries met in 
Geneva to set the objectives of the ongoing relief activities and to agree a 
medium-term intervention strategy. The main objective of the meeting was to 
match available resources with the needs of any country, thus making the relief 
process “pulled” by the needs of affected people, instead of “pushed” by the 
availability of some kind of resources.  
On January 26th 2005, one month after the tsunami, the United Nations 
estimated that all the disaster-affected local communities were receiving a 
primary support. The World Food Programme was constantly supplying food 
to 1,2 million people. More than 500.000 people were supplied with drinkable 
water. Children were going back to school. The humanitarian emergency was 
declared “stabilized”. “Despite the weakness and delays in the response, the 
relief phase passed rapidly and reasonably effectively” (Telford, Cosgrave, 
2006: 54). 
 
Theoretical background 
The cooperation and coordination problems highlighted by the tsunami 
case are common issues in humanitarian emergencies. Most of the literature 
focusing on disaster response deals (more or less directly) with cooperation and 
coordination themes and proposes specific intervention strategies.  
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A dominant stream of research emphasizes the importance to develop 
flexible and efficient plans (e.g. Quarantelli, 1982; 1985; Lagadec, 1993; Perry, 
Lindell, 2003). From this point of view, the planning process is the ideal place 
for implementing procedures for coordinating the behavior of the subjects 
involved in the rescue activities (Shelton, Sifers, 1994). The objectives of the 
rescue activities are clearly predefined: "a shared, well-defined mission is at the 
core of successful management in any setting, and the same is true during 
disaster management. The ability to specify relevant objectives requires that the 
incident be well understood and that active jurisdictions and authorities be well 
defined relative to it. If incident managers discover areas in which the mission, 
objectives, and priorities are unclear, unattainable, or participating agencies do 
not agree about them, they must work to generate clarity and explicit 
consensus" (Donahue, O'Keefe, 2007: 79). Coordination problems may emerge 
because of inefficient communication systems or ineffective leadership. 
Other contributions consider the disasters as events breaking the social 
equilibrium of a society, and analyze how a new, legitimate and long lasting 
equilibrium might be re-established (e.g. Chapman, 1954; Form et al., 1956; 
Baker, Chapman, 1962; Healy, 1969; Quarantelli, Dynes, 1977; Drabek, 1986). 
Underlying this approach, there is the assumption that external shocks modify 
the functional requirements a society must fulfil to survive; hence, after a 
disastrous event, an evolution toward a new equilibrium is required. Usually, 
such theoretical contributions belong to sociological studies and share a 
functionalist point of view. Their objective is to understand the strategies and 
the techniques (i.e. the coordination strategies) for allowing a community to 
efficiently move from a standing equilibrium to another (hopefully better). 
Other theoretical studies (e.g. Lanzara, 1983; Gephart, 1984; Weick, 1993; 
2007; Roux-Dufort, Vidaillet, 2003) highlight the role of improvisation processes 
in achieving effective relief interventions. According to such interactionist 
interpretations, the organization of the relief activities “emerges” spontaneously 
(ad-hoc, contextual coordination) from a set of creative, random, and sometimes 
irrational behaviors. Cooperation is emergent, and coordination is contextual 
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and based on direct communications, while predefined rules are usually 
ineffective and sometimes dangerous: "... [analyzing the facts related to a 
disaster] it means analyzing the preparedness, response, and recovery 
operations as they actually occurred, in contrast to what had been expected or 
ignored. It means separating the reality of action from the myths of planning 
and learned ignorance and recognizing that the basis for building effective crisis 
management lies in the human ability to recognize and correct mistakes" 
(Comfort, 2007: 189). 
Hence, even if declined and interpreted in different ways, cooperation 
and coordination are central concepts for understanding the organization in 
disaster. The definition of these concepts, however, is often implicit, fuzzy, 
omitted. Therefore, it is useful to refer to classic definitions and, in particular, to 
the fundamental contributions proposed by Chester Barnard and Herbert 
Simon. 
Simon (1947) stated that a collective behavior may be qualified as 
cooperative when the involved subjects prefer the same set of consequences, i.e. 
share (deliberately or not) a common goal. The fundamental characteristic of 
any cooperation is its common finalization (Maggi, 2003: 126). More in detail, 
subjects start to cooperate when they cannot achieve their personal goals 
independently, because of physical, biological, and/or cognitive limitations 
(Barnard, 1938). Obviously, for every participant, the objective of the 
cooperation is instrumental to the attainment of his own goals.  
Coordination may be defined as the process “providing each one with 
knowledge of the behaviors of the others upon which he can base his own 
decisions” (Simon, 1947: 81), it is the ordination process of the cooperative collective 
action (Maggi, 2003: 129-130). As Barnard pointed out, “activities cannot be 
coordinated unless there is first the disposition to make a personal act a 
contribution to an impersonal systems of acts, one in which the individual gives 
up personal control of what he does” (Barnard, 1938: 84). By means of 
coordination, the behavior of any subject is integrated into a cooperative 
pattern; if coordination is formally stated and agreed, cooperation may achieve 
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higher levels of efficiency. Based on these classic definitions, we can state that 
every cooperative action is coordinated, and that both the effectiveness and the 
efficiency of the coordination depend on the extent to which each subject 
involved in the cooperation is able to gather reliable information on the 
behavior of others. 
With reference to the organization in disaster, almost all the literature 
prefigures the presence of a common objective catalyzing the atomic behaviors 
of rescuers into a cooperative pattern. Contributions aimed at proposing 
efficient strategies for planning in advance the relief procedures consider the 
identification of a common objective as a necessary prerequisite for the 
breakdown of the plans. The whole architecture of the rescue plans is built 
around a clearly stated objective (e.g. Quarantelli, 1985; Lagadec, 1993; Perry, 
Lindell, 2003). For the literature interested in investigating the interventions 
necessary to re-establish a functional equilibrium in a society hit by a disaster, 
the final objective is the restoration of the equilibrium. The forces available in 
the field coalesce and are driven by the unavoidable need for a stable, legitimate 
equilibrium (e.g. Baker, Chapman, 1962). Even the interactionist propositions, 
focusing on ephemeral, temporary organization arising from creative 
“bricolage” processes, assign a considerable attention to the shared objective as 
an “occasion for structuring”. On the other hand, in the process of sensemaking 
driving the reconfiguration of the formal organization in case of emergency, the 
availability of a common goal allows the participants to develop shared 
representations of the reality (e.g. Weick, 1988; 1993).  
In general, the disaster-related literature takes the presence of a common 
goal for granted: in the extreme post-disaster conditions, all the rescue activities 
are supposed to be aimed at saving lives and alleviating sufferings. This means 
that, during post-disaster emergencies, cooperation would be arising almost 
spontaneously. Hence, all the problems related to actual rescue behavior should 
be attributed to the process of definition of the steps to be followed to achieve 
the common goal; ultimately, all the problems derive from decisions concerning 
the coordination of the relief behavior. As Simon (1947: 115) pointed out, “the 
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attainment of the best result implies that each member of the group knows his 
place in the scheme and is prepared to carry out his job with others. However, 
unless the intentions of each member of the group can be communicated to the 
others, such coordination is hardly possible. Each will base his behavior on his 
expectations of the behaviors of the others, but he will have no reason to expect 
they will fit into any preconceived plan. Lacking formal coordination, the result 
will be highly fortuitous”.  
According to this interpretation, the problems in the relief processes are 
associated with the definition of goals, but would be related to another 
analytical level, that of the coordination of the cooperative action. Hence, in 
order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of relief processes, it would be 
necessary to focus on coordination and regulation processes. However, it is 
interesting to focus on goal-setting processes in order to understand how how 
the agreement on very general goals, such as "to save lives", may be able to 
ensure a consistent integration of the cooperative behavior.  
Barnard (1938: 87) suggested that “if in fact there is important difference 
between the aspects of the purpose as objectively and cooperatively viewed, the 
divergences become quickly evident when the purpose is concrete, tangible, 
physical; but when the purpose is general, intangible, and of sentimental 
character, the divergences can be very wide yet not recognized”; in particular, 
he stresses that “when the purpose is less tangible – for example, in religious 
cooperation – the difference between objective purpose and purpose as  
cooperatively viewed by each person is often seen ultimately to result in 
disruption”. This point of view can be explained by adopting the Simon’s 
theory of bounded rationality. Indeed, according to Simon (1947), every 
decision making process carried out by the subjects is intendedly rational but 
only boundedly so.  
The rationality of the decision making process is limited by (1) the 
subject’s incapability to clearly define all the objectives of his behavior (and to 
accurately rank them in order of preference) and by (2) his incapability to 
exactly understand the cause-effect relationships to be developed to attain a 
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desired outcome. Even if not efficient, the behavior of the subject is not erratic, 
it is continuously directed toward a (roughly defined, variable) goal. In fact, at 
any moment, the subject addresses (more or less deliberately) his behavior 
coherently with his means-ends schema. This schema represents in hierarchical 
chain the goals inspiring the subject. In conditions of bounded rationality, such 
hierarchy would never be an integrated, fully connected chain. Furthermore, it 
is variable over the time, since it is influenced by the development of subject’s 
knowledge and by the evolution of his values: “instead of a single branching 
hierarchy, the structure of conscious motives is usually a tangled web or, more 
precisely, a disconnected collection of elements only weakly and incompletely 
tied together; and the integration of these elements becomes progressively 
weaker as the higher levels of the hierarchy – the more final ends – are reached” 
(Simon, 1947:  74). Nonetheless, even if incomplete and variable, the means-
ends schema is fundamental for attaining integration and consistency in the 
behavior, for pursuing coherence. 
Consequently, the subject places (deliberately or not) every goal he 
identifies within his means-ends schema; this new goal requires the attainment 
of intermediate goals (means) and it is instrumental to the achievement of 
higher-level goals. In this way, the subject depicts (under conditions of 
bounded rationality) a strategy consistent to the attainment of the desired state 
of world. The subject develops his hierarchy of objectives taking into account 
(1) his experience and his knowledge in order to derive some insights about the 
cause-effect relationships that actually link the phenomena involved, and (2) his 
system of values, to select coherent objectives. All the goal-setting activities 
involve two judgments: factual judgments and value judgments (Simon, 1947). 
The common goal of the cooperation is integrated by any subject into her 
means-ends schema. However, there is no evidence attesting the actual 
consistency of means-ends schema of the various subjects involved in a 
cooperation (Figure 3). In this case, the efforts aimed to coordinate the actual 
behavior of the subjects are unlikely to achieve their results, since the subjects 
F.M. BARBINI, COOPERATION AND GOAL CONFLICTS IN CRISIS SITUATIONS 
TAO DIGITAL LIBRARY - 2015 45 
formally operate to achieve a common goal but they adopt intermediate goals 
consistent with the pursuing of their own hierarchy of goals.  
In case of problems in the integration of the subjects’ means-ends 
schemes, the attempts aimed to encourage coordination between them will be 
doomed to failure since they focus operational aspects, not the root of the 
problem, which concerns the hierarchy of goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Cooperation and the integration of the cooperative behavior: a 
simplified representation of the partners’ means-ends schema. 
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disaster-ready institutions to make the world a better place, to maintain the 
geo-political equilibrium in the area, to gain visibility to attract additional 
resources, to keep the workforce alive and able to perform its activities, to 
establish partnerships in the area, or to demonstrate their reliability and to keep 
a continuous support of donors. In the same way, in order to save lives, disaster 
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ready institutions may arrange their intermediate objectives to save people 
immediately in need, to heal injured persons, to avoid epidemics, to keep the 
hit area safe, to accommodate the homeless, to protect the environment, to 
sustain the economic activities, or to restore the infrastructures. The elaboration 
of such hierarchical patterns of objectives is an individual task, there are no 
“invisible hands” ensuring the integration of the autonomous intermediate 
objectives into cooperative ones. 
The common tension toward a very general goal may result in 
ambiguities of the means-ends schema and, eventually, in cooperation 
inconsistency. Many of the operational coordination problems experienced in 
actual collaborative ventures are direct consequence of the lack of coherence 
among the participants’ intermediate goals, the general agreed objective being 
unable to foster the integration of individuals’ means-ends schema. The more 
the cooperative goal is general and indefinite, the more inconsistent the 
intermediate goals of the subjects will be. 
 
Reinterpreting the post-tsunami relief process 
As described above, as soon as the tsunami was over, survivors and 
available disaster-ready institutions, acting individually or in small auto-
regulated groups, started the relief activities.  
Their objectives were clear and (more or less deliberately) agreed: to save 
the people more in danger. The cooperating subjects shared a very immediate 
goal, and their behavior was tightly integrated by direct communication.  
As professional rescuers and additional resources arrived and new, 
wider objectives emerged (for example, the initial objective of saving those in 
needs was complemented with the necessity to make the disaster area safe and 
healthy and to provide affected people with primary means of support), the 
need for coordination became more and more relevant. Now, cooperative goals 
were “higher” (i.e. more generic, less direct) than the previous ones. 
Cooperating subjects “put” these general goals within their means-ends schema 
and the integration of the cooperative behavior became less obvious. In 
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addition, with a growing number of people and equipment in action, the 
coordination complexity increased considerably and it became impossible for 
the rescuers to coordinate just by mutual adjustment: the initial contextual 
regulation process was becoming not only inefficient, but also ineffective. 
Professional rescuers coordinated their behavior also by means of predefined 
rules, hence making relief activities more efficient. Nevertheless, relevant 
problems related to the global coordination of the international relief efforts 
remained: many disaster areas were not receiving any support, while others, 
usually the ones located closers to ports or airports, were crowded by large 
quantities of unnecessary resources. In addition, the continuous flow of 
resources and equipment was immobilizing the airports and other 
communication infrastructures. Three main problems emerged: “the 
proliferation of agencies made coordination more expensive and less effective; 
generous funding (especially private) reduced agencies’ need to coordinate; and 
the perceived need for quick, tangible, agency-specific results fuelled 
competition for visibility, ‘beneficiaries’ and projects. The absence of agreed 
field representation mechanisms for (well funded) NGOs and poor 
coordination skills among some managers complicated coordination. These 
were compounded by lack of clarity between coordination at the operational 
level (who does what) and coordination at the policy level (including joint 
advocacy)” (Telford, Cosgrave, 2006: 22). 
These problems emerged because every subject involved in the relief 
process was integrating the common goal, e.g. “to save lives and to alleviate 
sufferings”, into his means-ends chain; this integration imposed the definition 
of a set of intermediate goals and behaviors instrumental to the achievement of 
the final goal and imposed to put the final goal in relationship with higher-level 
goals. Many means-ends schema were being developed, hence every institution 
directed its behavior toward a particular set of objectives consistent with its 
own schema.  
At this time, the disaster-ready institutions were cooperating for saving 
lives, but they were also competing for resources, for visibility, and, ultimately, 
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for gaining the leadership of the relief process. In addition, the intermediate 
goals deployed by such institutions were unable to allow efficient instrumental 
behavior. Agencies were competing for projects, locations, staff, and publicity: 
“high levels of funding led to heightened competition both for partners and for 
the area in which to work” (Telford, Cosgrave, 2006: 57); “Hundreds of national 
and international organizations – some experienced, some inexperienced – were 
under pressure to show quick results amid relentless media attention. [...] 
Unprecedented funding further limited the incentive to coordinate and led to 
competition among cash-rich agencies for projects and, ultimately, publicity” 
(TGLLPSC, 2009: 22); “Despite major demands elsewhere for staffing (in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and sub-Saharan Africa, for instance), most agencies were 
able to deploy personnel, including a number of experienced managers, in a 
relatively short time. Some personnel were shifted from other emergencies” 
(Telford, Cosgrave, 2006: 54); “Some donors prefer reconstructing primary 
schools due to higher visibility and long-lasting nature of the support” (World 
Bank, 2005: 75). Even the assessments and the situation reports elaborated by 
the relief institutions were influenced by their individual objectives: “too often, 
situation reports and assessments served the interest or mandate of the 
assessing agency more than those of the potential beneficiaries” (de Ville de 
Goyet, Morinière, 2006: 12). 
OCHA, which was in principle in charge for the coordination of 
international relief efforts, was overwhelmed by “political” (i.e. related with the 
definition and coordination of the objectives of the relief activities) problems. 
Many resources were used to coordinate activities instead of in direct 
mitigation activities (Flint, Goyder, 2006). “Despite the best efforts of OCHA to 
harness and broadcast information and technical know-how within the 
humanitarian community, it had neither the authority nor in some cases the 
influence to direct events. It was thus constantly in a responsive mode, 
frequently criticized for not providing timely information, though rarely 
questioned as the pre-eminent international coordinating body. The reduction 
of operational costs thanks to, for example, common services was not always 
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self-evident, as many well-funded NGOs developed their own logistics and 
information services, including bilateral relations with military forces. Where 
there were gaps at sectorial or geographic levels, these were often due to the 
“crowding” of agencies in certain areas, the selection of high-visibility sectors 
and the stretching of traditional mandates within agencies” (Bennet et al., 2006: 
78). 
It is possible to identify the lack of coordination of intermediate 
objectives as the fundamental problem inhibiting a coherent development of the 
instrumental behavior. Relief coordination problems were direct consequences 
of such lack of higher-level coordination.  
At the end of December, the Regional Core Group was introduced: in 
this case the participants succeeded in defining intermediate objective, thus 
being able to develop integrated intervention processes and to coordinate their 
behaviors by means of efficient standard rules and plans. On January, the need 
for cooperation and coordination became so pressing that the United Nations 
had to hold an international conference and a summit meeting to coordinate 
intermediate objectives and instrumental relief behavior. In particular, the 
international conference held in Jakarta gathered the subjects involved in field 
operations, but it was not sufficient to overcome all the problems affecting the 
relief process. It was necessary to convene the political leaders of the countries 
involved in the relief process in order to define the general guidelines to be 
followed. In other words, the intermediate objectives of the international relief 
process were detailed and coordinated only at the eve of January. From now on, 
the relief process gained in terms of unity of efforts and became easier to 
coordinate. In fact, thanks to the intermediate objectives agreed in these 
meetings, OCHA was finally able to develop a coherent instrumental behavior. 
In particular, OCHA became an “information hub” for the disaster-affected area 
and was soon in a position strong enough to match populations’ needs with 
available resources, to define intervention priorities, to set relief general rules 
and operational routines. In addition, IASC proved to be a very useful forum 
(both in global and local terms), enabling the actual coordination of the 
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international institutions and NGOs acting in the field. In such a situation, the 
Regional Core Group became useless and it was soon dismantled. The rescue 
teams were now acting with higher levels of order, by applying the preliminary 
regulation set by OCHA and IASC. Thanks the higher integration of the 
behavior achieved by rescuers and the unprecedented amount of resources 
mobilized, by the end of January OCHA declared the Indian Ocean tsunami 
emergency “stabilized”. 
 
The reform of the international humanitarian system 
As a result of the apparent failure of the international humanitarian 
system in occasion of the tsunami emergency, governments, public opinion and 
mass-media asked for an urgent reform of the whole system. Hence, the 
tsunami emergency revitalized the debate on prospected reform of international 
humanitarian response system which was being developed by the United 
Nations. 
In such a situation, the United Nations stimulated the reform process by 
means of two fundamental initiatives: the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-
2015, and the Humanitarian Response Review carried out in 2004-2005. From a 
strategic point of view, “The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building 
the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disaster” (issued by the World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction held on January 2005 in Kobe) represent a 
fundamental milestone for the future interventions on the subject. Indeed, the 
Hyogo Framework identifies the strategic goals and priorities for action of the 
whole humanitarian response system for the next years (ISDR 2005). Previously, 
in 2004, the ERC had launched the Humanitarian Response Review to assess the 
humanitarian response capacities of the UN, NGOs, Red Cross Red Crescent 
Movement and other key humanitarian actors including the International 
Organization for Migration, and identify the gaps and make recommendations 
to address them (Adinolfi et al., 2005: 14).  
An immediate outcome of these policies and analysis has been the 
adoption of the “cluster approach”, i.e. a deep redefinition of the leadership and 
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coordination roles assigned to international relief agencies. This redefinition, 
agreed and developed by IASC, introduced the cluster as sets of relief agencies 
involved in tasks headed toward similar results (e.g. camp coordination an 
management, emergency telecommunication, early recovery, emergency 
shelter, health, logistics, nutrition, protection, water and sanitation). Each 
cluster is coordinated by a “lead agency” accountable to the ERC for “ensuring 
system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond humanitarian 
emergencies, and for ensuring grater predictability and more effective inter-
agency responses” (IASC, 2006: 4). The lead agency has to set standards, build 
response capacity, and manage operational activities within its cluster. 
Initially, nine global clusters have been identified and assigned under the 
responsibility of specific lead agencies: camp coordination and management – 
UNHCR (for conflict-generated internally-displaced persons) and IOM (for 
disasters); emergency telecommunications – OCHA as overall process owner; 
UNICEF for data collection; WFP for common security telecommunications 
service; early recovery – UNDP; emergency shelter – UNHCR (for conflict-
generated internally-displaced persons) and International Federation of Red 
Cross (for disasters); health – WHO; logistics – WFP, nutrition – UNICEF; 
protection – UNHCR (for conflict-generated internally-displaced persons) and 
UNICEF and OHCHR (for disasters); water and sanitation – UNICEF. Other 
sectors (with lower coordination problems) have not been organized in global 
clusters; such sectors are food (led by WFP), refugees (UNHCR), education 
(UNICEF) and agriculture (FAO) (Bennet et al., 2006: 24). 
At the country level, the cluster approach involves the identification of 
leading agencies with clearly defined responsibilities and capacities. Obviously, 
country clusters have to arrange their activities in accordance with the global 
strategy and guidelines. Moreover, at the country level, a Humanitarian 
Country Team (HCT) has been introduced, as a local forum gathering the 
agencies involved in humanitarian prevention, mitigation, and recovery 
activities. The HCT would act as a local replica of IASC, supporting the 
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Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator in the development of 
contingency planning and in the coordination of humanitarian activities. 
As to this initial stage, the cluster approach developed by OCHA appears 
as a coherent step toward the overcoming of the cooperation problems 
highlighted by the tsunami case. In particular, the delimitation of the final 
objective of each global cluster would allow easier internal agreement on the 
intermediate objectives and on the instrumental decisions and behaviors. 
Hence, the integration of behavior within the cluster should be stronger and the 
coordination more efficient. 
As a matter of fact, some remarks remain in terms of integration of 
behavior among clusters, both at the global and country level. In fact, due to the 
lack of formal solutions for integrating the intermediate objectives of different 
clusters, ineffectiveness and inefficiency may affect the relief process. To 
overcome such risks, the roles of OCHA and IASC (at the global level) and of 
Human Coordinator and HCT (at the country level) are fundamental and 
critical. Additional concerns originate from the attribution to some agencies of a 
leadership role in more than one cluster (e.g. UNICEF leads, or co-leads, four 
cluster) thus preventing focalization and specialization. 
Nevertheless, the reform’s rationale appears to be consistent with the 
need for higher operational coordination; the reform has also the merit of not 
imposing additional predetermined formalized procedures. 
 
Synthesis  
This essay analyzed the problems affecting the cooperative relief 
processes in post-disaster emergency situations, evidencing how a generic 
finalization of the cooperation cannot enable highly integrated behaviors, thus 
creating relevant coordination problems.  
The perspective adopted by this contribution is based on the assumption 
that a collective behavior becomes cooperative when the involved subjects 
share a common goal. In case of post-disaster relief activities, the large majority 
of the relevant literature takes for granted the agreement of the rescuers on a 
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common goal; then, all the problems affecting the cooperation process are 
attributed to a lack of coordination, e.g. to synchronization problems, to 
communication inefficiencies, to inconsistencies affecting the authority 
breakdown system. We have proposed a different interpretation: the agreement 
on a common, generic goal is not, by itself, sufficient for ensuring the 
integration of partners’ decision and behavior processes, instead, the final goal 
is placed by every subject within his own means-ends schema. Hence, the final 
goal of the cooperation is interpreted by each partner as a means for achieving 
individual higher-level objectives. On the other hand, every partner defines a 
set of intermediate goals, which are (according to his knowledge and values) 
consistent to the attainment of the final goal of the cooperation. Finally, every 
partner defines a set of instrumental goals for achieving the intermediate goals. 
The means-ends schema developed by the participants in the cooperative action 
can be very different and, in many ways, conflictual or competitive. As a 
consequence, the agreement on coherent and consistent intermediate goals 
becomes fundamental to allow the achievement of higher levels of effectiveness 
in the cooperative action, as evidenced by the case of the Indian ocean tsunami 
In any case, the adoption of a perspective based on Simon’s theory of 
bounded rationality (1947) does not allow to assume that partners’ agreement 
on intermediate goals can make the cooperative action objectively rational. In 
fact, even if it could be possible to foster the integration of behaviors that are 
instrumental toward the cooperative goal, each subject would make this goal 
instrumental with respect to her own additional goals.. Hence, it is necessary to 
understand that the subjects involved in a cooperative action actually develop 
behaviors that are, at the same time, cooperative and competitive. For example, 
while we are used to think that the players of a football team will cooperate 
with teammates and compete with opponents to win the match, if we take into 
account the different decision-making levels, it becomes possible to highlight 
more complex phenomena in which cooperation and competition coexist at the 
different levels of decision-making processes. The same situation takes place in 
cases of interfirm cooperation or teamworking. 
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In other words, the agreement on a common goal (i.e. the cooperation 
toward the achievement of that goal) is not by itself sufficient to ensure the 
integration of the atomic behaviors of the partners, since every participants will 
base the behavior on her means-ends schema.  Finally, it is important to 
consider that, under conditions of bounded rationality, it is impossible to 
objectively define goals and to perfectly make the sub-goals consistent, at any 
level of the scheme. 
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